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Abstract
If citizens of di¤erent countries belonging to an economic union adhere
to di¤erent and deeply rooted cultural norms, when these countries interact
they may nd it impossible to agree on e¢ cient policies, especially in hard
times. Political leaders are bound to follow policies that do not violate their
countrys cultural norms. This paper provides a simple positive theory and a
compelling case study of the Euro area crisis to highlight the importance of
cultural clashes when economies integrate. We also provide a normative argu-
ment about the desirability of institutional integration: a political union, with
a common enforcement agency, is the more benecial the greater is cultural
diversity in an economic union.
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Europe will be forged in crises and will be the sum of the solutions adopted for
those crises(Jean Monnet).
1 Introduction
Over the past 20 years there has been a remarkable increase in economic unions and
trade integration driven by the prospect that integrating countries would benet from
economies of scale and access to a larger market. This process has taken a variety
of forms. Some, like the proliferation of bilateral trade agreements, are relatively
contained in scope. At the other extreme, economic and currency unions, such as
those set up by the Caribbean countries and most notably by the Euro area countries,
have far reaching implications for the nature of the interactions in the merged pool
of heterogenous populations. These latter agreements can be viewed as part of a
process that leads geographically close but still institutionally and culturally di¤erent
countries to allow their people to interact with each other at many levels while
each country maintains political control and sovereignty. This implies that national
governments are in charge of and are responsible for macroeconomic decisions and
outcomes. A step further in the integration process is to delegate some of the power
of the national governments to federal institutions designed to manage the decision
process of area-wide relevant issues.1
In this paper we study the problem faced by two countries that are culturally
distant from each other and face the opportunity to join a union. We will call eco-
nomic union any economic integration where constraints to international exchanges
and relationships are lifted, but no power is given to any central institution in terms
of scal policy, political decisions, regulations, etc.; we will call political union, a
union where every citizen of the various countries in the union comes to consider
the central institutions as the only relevant one vis-a-vis key policies of relevance
for the whole union, eliminating continuous negotiations between the leaders of the
members of the union.
Following Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2006) we dene "culture" broadly as a
set of norms and beliefs that guide the behavior of the members of a social group and
that are transmitted fairly unchanged from generation to generation. This denition
captures a key feature of these values and beliefs: their slow moving nature. We
1Switzerland is an example of such a political integration arrangement: a set of culturally distinct
countries (the cantons) share a common currency and a common market while federal institutions
are designed to manage area relevant decisions, including the re-composition of conicts that the
di¤erent cultures may give rise to (Bertola, 2014).
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argue that an economic union o¤ers great prosperity opportunities for each side but
also entails the risk of exposing their populations to a "clash of cultures" - i.e. a
conict arising from the interaction of people with di¤erent cultural values. The
contrast we describe happens at the level of private interactions between individuals
as well as at the level of political leaders that must conform to the cultural norms
and beliefs of their electorate: leaders cannot pursue strategies that go against deeply
rooted norms and beliefs even when doing so could be welfare-improving for their
citizens2. This conformity constraint becomes salient in particular when leaders of
two countries with di¤erent cultures come to negotiate about policies or rules that
do not t well with some traits of their original cultures. The possibility that the
optimal course of action entails policies welcomed by one electorate but opposed
by the other on cultural grounds, is a major political impasse which we denote as
cultural clash. As noted in Huntington (1996), cultural conict is one of the most
important types of conict to consider going forward, and our goal is to examine how
it interacts and evolves with economic integration and institutional development.3
We develop a simple evolutionary theory of culture formation in order to evaluate
what happens when two countries, on di¤erent cultural steady states, merge into an
economic union. When the two economies merge, the primary problem is the clash
between citizens and conforming leaders of di¤erent cultures. We show how the
choice itself of the level of economic integration depends on the cultural distance
and on the business cycle. In particular, we show a successful economic union may
be formed when economic benets from integration are relatively large and cultures
not too distant. Furthermore, while the formation of an economic union (without
common institutions) may be the optimal outcome initially, if the ex-post realization
of the economic benets is lower than initially anticipated - i.e. a "crisis" realizes -
then the cultural clash may surface. In fact, the generalized loss of welfare due to
the clash, which is increasing in the degree of cultural heterogeneity, becomes more
salient during bad economic times and cannot vanish rapidly given the inertia of
cultural norms. In such circumstances countries may reconsider participation in the
union, facing the choice of either breaking up and reverting to autarchy or otherwise
2Microfounded models of political pandering have been formalized extensively in political econ-
omy (see e.g. Maskin and Tirole, 2004). We do not microfound the conformity constraint of the
politicians in this paper.
3For example, it would be very di¢ cult for Indias leaders to pass a law that forces Indian food
rms to produce beef formula when a famine hits the country. Even if political representatives
knew this may be the best policy from a nutritional point of view, it would simply fail to pass or,
even if passed, it would fail to succeed because it would not be followed by most of the people.
Anticipating this reaction, the leader would just avoid proposing it and pander to the prevailing
public opinion.
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provide it with a set of federal institutions that grant greater political integration.
The latter solution, we show, is more desirable the higher is the cultural distance,
or the costs of the clash, and thus the benet of mitigating it. Thus, for instance,
the fact that Europe has countries with more heterogeneous cultures than it was the
case for individual states within the US at the time of the US Constitution should
push towards an a fortiori argument in favor of centralization, rather than the other
way round, which is more the common sense.
Our view of the cultural clash and its consequences for the debate about new
institutions has a clear application to the Euro crisis context. In Europe, a greater
frequency and salience of principal agent relationships between individuals or agen-
cies rooted in di¤erent cultures was clearly determined by the lower transaction and
mobility costs associated to the introduction of the common currency. Merging into
an economic union carries benets in terms of enlargement of the total available
opportunities due to economies of scale and scope (see e.g. Baldwin, 2006) which
translate in larger (expected) payo¤s to interacting parties. The cost is the potential
exposure to a cultural clash which increases with the cultural distance between the
merging countries. The discovery in October 2009 that the previous Greek govern-
ment cooked the books, hiding half of the government scal decit, raised the aware-
ness in Germany about the pervasiveness of moral hazard at all levels in Greece,
and the anger led to a clear desire to punish. According to various observers, early
action would have contained the crisis both in scope and length, but the culture
of responsibility, enforcement and punishment present in Germany made it almost
impossible even for the political leaders to go against that sentiment and help the
situation right away.
German political leaders are well aware of the dangers of delaying the resolution
of a local debt crisis, and can foresee the possible consequences of the punishment
strategy for their own country, but are bound by a conformity constraint: the need
to conform with the widely shared and deeply rooted cultural norms of their fellow
citizens that, as we document in detail in the paper, establishes punishment of the
group cheaters, which in this case happen to be the Greeks.4
One of the messages of this paper is that if an economic union is complemented by
forms of political union, then we should expect much better management of cultural
clashes. Indeed, a political union entails the creation of some type of central authority
that by denition eliminates the game between sovereign states, freeing them from
the conformity constraint and overcoming the materialization of the cultural clash.
Put di¤erently, the central authority is not bound to any of the sovereign cultures
4Some political leaders may try to ease the conformity constraint by steering public opinion, but
this usually takes time, which unavoidably delays action.
4
and would thus avoid reliance on excessive punishment as well as excessive moral
hazard, softening the costs of the cultural clash.
The choice to form an economic union in Europe rather than a political union is
now being criticized on multiple grounds, but the importance of managing cultural
clashes is an important and largely overlooked problem. Culturally heterogeneous
countries economically united without joint political and legal institutions are more
clash prone and this clash becomes more intense and apparent in times of crisis. The
sequential integration choices in Europe as well as other monetary unions such as
the African Monetary Union project5, are far from ideal and can only be explained
by a reluctance to lose sovereignty by the individual states.6
In our model we treat agents interactions not as symmetric bilateral exchanges,
but as principal-agent interactions, thus highlighting the counterparty risk. In fact,
these are the type of interactions where the cultural traits we want to highlight matter
the most. A culture is represented in our framework as what strategies people play
when they interact.This way we capture the notion developed in North (1991), that
culture constrains human interactions when cooperation is hard to achieve. The focus
on interactions allows us to trace the evolution of culture using replicator dynamics
(as in Boyd and Richerson, 1985 and 2005).7 Given this view of an economy as a
collection of principal-agent relationships (state vs. tax payer, bank vs. borrower,
rm vs. employee, etc.), we model interactions as sequential move games where
the agent can cheat and the principal can punish, and the cheat-punish outcome is
always suboptimal. We show that evolution can bring a population to multiple steady
states with low or high levels of e¢ ciency, cheat-forgive and no-cheat respectively.
5The 1991 Abuja treaty created the African Economic Community and called for an African
Economic Community (AEC) with a single currency, now planned for 2023. The AEC would
absorb the two regional currency unions in Africa (the West African CFA franc and the Central
African CFS franc), an example of staged integration.
6The current political debate in Europe is consistent with the implications of the theoretical
model. During the unfolding of the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area the creation of a more
integrated scal union has gained momentum as a policy option (see, e.g. Marzinotto, Sapir and
Wol¤ (2011) and Ferguson and Barbieri (2012)). Most interestingly, in reaction to the crisis, in
January 2014 the EU has decided to adopt a single banking supervisory mechanism and a single
banking crisis resolution authority - what is called the banking union. Though the scope and reach
of this institution is still being hotly debated, its adoption is exactly what our model captures when
predicting the adoption of a single enforcement federal authority, in the direction of a political
union.
7We ignore instead the evolution of individual values that does not relate directly to behavior in
strategic situations. For models on the transmission of individual values, see Tabellini (2008b), Bisin
and Verdier (2000b, 2001), Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2008), possibly accounting for learning
through socialization (Bisin and Verdier,2000a).
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Our focus is on what happens when two populations acting in accord to di¤erent
steady states representing di¤erent cultural norms integrate into one economy. In
this case the integrated economy faces a cultural clash, which takes the form of a
cheat-punish outcome in many interactions, an outcome not observed in the steady
state of a culturally homogeneous country. The normative results we derive are
based on a key aspect of cultural norms. That is, cultural norms evolve very slowly
compared to the speed of change of formal institutions, particularly those related
to governance (Williamson, 2000): while culture evolves gradually institutions can
jump. This feature is what makes the creation of a new institution a viable response
to mitigate a cultural clash, which would otherwise persist in time.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we discuss the relationship with
the literature. In section 3 we develop our evolutionary model of culture in any
economy, our theory of the cultural clash and highlight the incentives to form new
and common institutions at the cost of loss in sovereignty. In section 4 we apply
the model to interpret the recent Euro area history focusing on the cultural clash
between Greece and Germany. Section 5 concludes.
2 Relation to the literature
This paper is related to several strands of literature. First, it contributes to a bur-
geoning set of studies on the role of culture in explaining di¤erences in economic
prosperity across countries and communities (see among others Greif, 1994; Landes,
1999; Mokyr, 2012; Tabellini, 2008a; Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004, 2013);
Roland, 2010; and Nunn, 2012). These papers rely on the persistence of culture to
explain enduring e¤ects of old historical episodes on current di¤erences in economic
success. While we retain cultural persistence, we focus on the role that slow-to-
change cultural norms and beliefs can play in dealing with shocks that are likely to
occur at the business cycle frequency. Hence it bears a link with the few papers that
have attempted to insert culture into macroeconomic models (e.g. Akerlof, 2007) or
test empirically whether culture can be a cause of macroeconomic imbalances (Buet-
zer et al, 2012). Furthermore, while most of these papers view cultural norms as
a¤ecting economic prosperity because they support cooperation and thus facilitate
exchange among people (e.g. Tabellini, 2008a; Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2004,
2012; Landes, 1999), or because they enhance individual motivation (Gorodnichenko
and Roland, 2011a), or because they dictate directly individual behavior (Akerlof,
2007), in our case cultural norms a¤ect macroeconomic outcomes because they are a
constraint on policy makers and institutions, limiting their freedom to adopt the best
policy in the given circumstances. This is a clear example of the more general view
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that we propose, that cultural norms can be a potentially important source of friction
in political economy. These frictions need to be studied even if one had the general
belief that the main source of cross country di¤erences in prosperity stem from dif-
ferences in institutions design (see e.g. Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012): in fact, the
type of problems we identify and deal with relate to the consequences, rather than
the causes, of cultural clashes. Our contribution highlights how cultural clashes can
result in changes in sentiments towards other groups and nations. We show that the
Greeks cheating behavior triggers a desire to punish them among the Germans that
was absent before the Greeks cheated; in turn, Germany punishing behavior triggers
resentment among the Greeks who expect forgiving. These changes in sentiments
are the manifestation of the clash between di¤erent and unadapted cultural norms.
Indeed, we use changes in sentiments to document the clash of cultures.
Second, our work relates to various papers that rely on cultural distance to explain
patterns of international trade (e.g. Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2009; Fisman,
Hamao and Wang, 2012). We highlight the fact that the conformity constraint is
more likely to be identied when two (or more) cultures are merged - as when a pool
of countries decide to enter an economic or monetary union - and thus a cultural
clash can occur and become visible.
Third, the paper relates to a number of contributions that study the interplay
between cultural norms (informal institutions) and legal norms (formal institutions)
and their mutual inuences. Several papers stress the fact that culture and legal
institutions tend to coevolve (Tabellini, 2008b; Gorodnichenko and Roland, 2011b;
Bisin and Verdier, 2012). In our model too in the long run institutions and cul-
ture may move together, but the process may be far from smooth. In our model
institutions can change discretely - or at least at a much faster speed than culture.
Hence, they may adjust in response to a potentially harmful cultural clash when a
culturally heterogenous community is hit by a shock. Culture may subsequently and
slowly adapt, possibly a¤ected by the new institutional set up.
Finally, our contribution is related to the literature on the formation and inte-
gration of states. As in the literature on the formation and integration of states
(Alesina and Spolaore, 2003 and Spolaore, 2013) we also emphasize the trade o¤
between economies of scale from merging economies and the costs of combining het-
erogeneous populations (in our case heterogeneity in cultures). We argue that the
desire to improve the terms of this trade o¤ provides a basis for a novel argument in
favor of a political/ scal union. Fiscal union can be benecial for a variety of rea-
sons; because it may produce greater equality (Morelli, Yang and Ye, 2012); because
it provides stability and insurance (e.g. Luque, Morelli and Tavares, 2014; Fahri and
Werning, 2012); or because it may have a discipline e¤ect - in the sense that when
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the policy is conducted at the union level the scope for local moral hazard by the
participant countries is reduced. We stress instead that a scal union, much like a
banking union or any other centralization of governance or harmonization of rules,
would play an important role in tempering and managing frictions in a culturally
non homogeneous community that is already bound by a single currency or a free
trade agreement. Said di¤erently, faster to change institutions can be the solution
to the costs imposed by slow to adjust cultural norms in response to a change in the
environment.
3 Theory
3.1 The Role of Culture
We develop a simple evolutionary theory of the integration of cultures and institu-
tions. In the long time frame we consider, institutions are malleable and can be
potentially adjusted while cultures have inertia. There is evidence that: (1) culture
evolves slowly;8 (2) di¤erent cultures can (and often must) coexist.9 We adopt a
simple evolutionary model where indeed (1) cultures, simply dened as proles of
strategies in an economy, evolve slowly and (2) may have to coexist. In particular,
(1) is achieved by assuming that behavior adjusts following replicator dynamics, as
in Boyd and Richerson (1985, 2005). In our setup, as in many others with di¤erent
frictions (see e.g. Tabellini 2008b), the presence of di¤erent cultures is described as
di¤erent steady states in the evolutionary process.
While there are many models of multiplicity of cultures as multiple equilibria or
multiple steady states, the rst innovation here is that we ask what happens when
two di¤erent cultures have to merge, for example due to an economic or monetary
8A growing literature provides models of how culture is transmitted and why it persists. In
Bisin and Verdier (2000a) cultural transmission is explained by parentsdesire to transmit to their
children their own traits. Tabellini (2008b) identies the source of cultural persistence in the fact
that parents use their own preferences in deciding which set of values to instill in their children.
Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2008b) model persistence in trust beliefs as opposed to norms. A
parallel empirical literature documents the persistence of cultural attitudes over several centuries
by showing that current cultural traits are correlated with long-gone historical episodes (Nunn and
Wanchekon, 2011; Voigtlï¿nder and Voth, 2012; Grosjean (2011); Alesina et al., 2011; Guiso,
Sapienza and Zingales, 2013)) or across three or four generations (e.g. Tabellini, 2008a), Algan and
Cahuc (2010).
9Coexistence of cultures is a common phenomenon documented for many countries. A few
examples are the US melting pot, modelled in Bisin and Verdier (2000a), Switzerland multiple
religions (Basten and Betz, 2012), ItalysNorth-South cultural divide (Putnam, 1993).
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union between countries. Our broad view is that while cultures of countries evolve
slowly hence this merge of culture alone generates a cultural clash, the leaders of
countries with di¤erent cultures have the ability to agree on a change of institutions.
The new institutions have the potential to change fairly quickly and ideally mitigate
the e¤ects of the clash due to the merging of cultures.10
Our leading example is the Eurozone: the creation of the Eurozone is a shock
to the type and frequency of interactions among agents with di¤erent cultures. In
particular, we take Greece and Germany as the most salient exponents of two op-
posing cultures, and we will later document the cultural clash between them and its
consequences. Additional national or international institutions might help mitigate
this clash, as we will argue.
3.2 The Economic Interactions
We describe an economy as a set of bilateral interactions between pairs of agents
that are programmed to play specic strategies. We assume that an economy is
described as a set of bilateral principal-agent transactions, as in North (1991). In
each match of two players, there is one having to choose rst between a responsible
action (e.g. when an agent chooses the action desired by the principal without moral
hazard or simply when an agent decides to respect the law) and a cheating action
(e.g. when an agent shirks or falls for the temptation of short run gains); then the
second player (a principal or a counterpart in a contract of whatever kind or the State
itself) having to decide (or implementing) a reaction, which we describe by the choice
between punishment and forgiveness. We divide the many types of private exchanges
and public relationships that constitute an economic system in two sets j = A;C,
described below. The representation of the basic principal-agent interaction for every
type of game j is as follows:
10According to Williamson (2000), while cultural norms typically change at a frequency (in years)
between 102 to 103, governance institutions can change every 10 years.
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Figure 1: Basic Game Structure
Assumption 1: u1(cp) < u
j
1(r); u2(cp) < u2(cf) < u
j
2(r).
The rst part of assumption 1 states that for any agent in any game the utility of
cheating and being punished is always lower than the utility of a responsible action,
an assumption necessary in order to make the punishment action payo¤ relevant.
The second part of assumption 1 states that for a principal punishing is costly and,
of course, the utility of a responsible action by the agent is higher than the utility of
forgiving a cheating action.
What remains unspecied is the relationship between u1(cf) and u
j
1(r). We
assume that uj1(r) varies with the type of game j:
uC1 (r) < u1(cf) < u
A
1 (r):
That is, we distinguish between:
1. Aligned-interest games (A games, henceforth) where u1(cf) < uA1 (r); and
2. Cheating-prone games (C games, henceforth), where u1(cf) > uC1 (r):
11
11Some bilateral relationships are more cheating prone than others: incentive to cheat on taxes or
free riding on contributions greatly vary across cultures and levels of institutional enforcement, but
the moral hazard temptation is often there. In private exchanges of observable goods or services
the gains from trade are more symmetric, and hence alignment of interest in exploiting the gains
from trade tends to prevail. Borrowing money and e¤ort provision by employees are part of private
exchanges that are sort of in between, in the sense that there is an element of gains from trade
and an element of moral hazard opportunity, which once again may vary with culture and with
institutional enforcement.
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Economies can di¤er in terms of the fraction and relative importance of A trades
with respect to C trades: denoting by  2 (0; 1) the fraction of A trades, an economy
with a higher  is less exposed to the consequences of moral hazard compared to
an economy with a lower . In a given economy, the frequency of C trades and A
trades depends, intuitively, on the state of the economy: when things go well and the
economy is in a boom, there are more opportunities and hence higher opportunity
costs of cheating. So our premise is that  is larger in good times. However, the
incentive to cheat tends to be higher when opportunities of enrichment are lacking
from the market. Thus, we will assume that  is positively correlated with the
business cycle. In other words, the scope of cheating grows during crises.12
Type A games trivially lead to responsible actions in every culture: the unique
equilibrium outcome is r. Given assumption 1, C games have two Nash Equilibria:
The rst Nash Equilibrium, (c; f), is subgame perfect; the other equilibrium, (r; p), is
not subgame perfect as it involves the commitment by player 2 to punish the cheating
action of player 1. Responsible actions are in most interpretations associated with
higher total welfare, hence we assume that:
Assumption 2:
P
i ui(cf) <
P
i u
C
i (r) <
P
i u
A
i (r)
The unique Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium in a C game in the absence of
commitment is suboptimal in the utilitarian sense. The equilibrium (c; f) is pre-
ferred by a player in role 1, but it does not maximize total welfare. We think of
di¤erent cultural values as crucial ingredients that may generate di¤erent equilibria.
In particular, certain cultural values may generate the ability to commit to enforce
contracts, laws and responsibility, hence allowing to achieve the higher welfare Nash
Equilibrium. As standard in the literature, we consider di¤erent cultures as di¤erent
equilibria. In what follows our notion of equilibrium will be evolutionary stability.
3.3 Culture-based Selection
We analyze the evolution of strategies in A and C games starting from any initial con-
dition, i.e. starting from any set of initial strategies according to standard replicator
dynamics. Consider rst an economy in isolation. Suppose that such an economy is
large, in the sense that there are a large number of random matches between players,
and in every such random match one player is in the position of player 1 and the
other one in the shoes of player 2. Pairs of individuals, one from the population
12Several papers document a countercyclical behavior of criminal activities broadly dened (e.g.
Cook, P.J and G. Zarkin, 1985; Fougère, Kramarz and Pouget. 2009; Raphael and Winter-Ebmer,
2001) and some are able to show a causal e¤ect of a deterioration of economic opportunities on
dishonest or illegal activities (Bignon, Caroli and Galbiati, 2014).
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of agents (role 1) and one from the population of principals (role 2), are randomly
matched to play the game above. Each individual is programmed to play one of the
two pure strategies available to her. Denote by x 2 [0; 1] the fraction of rst movers
programmed to play Cheat, and by y the fraction of second movers programmed to
play Forgive. A state of the world is fully characterized by the population split (x; y).
Starting from any initial population split (x; y), we want to see how this population
split evolves over time and whether it converges to a steady state. The replicator
dynamics logic implies that for any given population split (x; y) the proportion of
individuals playing Cheat (x) increases if and only if the average payo¤ to playing
Cheat is larger than the average payo¤ of rst movers. Namely, evolutionary dy-
namics assumes that individual-types that are tter than average types thrive, and
conversely. More precisely, the relative change in x is proportional to the tness
of the strategy Cheat, i.e. the di¤erence in payo¤s between Cheat and the current
average payo¤ of rst movers, namely
_x
x
= (u1(cf)y + u1(cp)(1  y)) 
 
uj1(r)(1  x) + u1(cf)xy + u1(cp)x(1  y)

Likewise, according to replicator dynamics the relative change in y is proportional
to the tness of the action Forgive relative to the average tness, namely:
_y
y
=
 
u2(cf)x+ u
j
2(r)(1  x)
   uj2(r)(1  x) + u2(cf)xy + u2(cp)x(1  y)
where the rst term is the payo¤ of Forgive against a proportion (x; 1  x) of rst
movers, the second is the average tness or payo¤of the population (y; 1  y) against
a proportion (x; 1  x). Normalizing, without loss of generality, ui(cp) = 0 8i, the
system can be written as
_x
x
=
 
u1(cf)y   uj1(r)

(1  x); _y
y
= (u2(cf)x) (1  y)
Starting from any initial interior population split (x0; y0) the system evolves in the
following way: y is non-decreasing always, x decreases (and eventually reaches zero)
as long as y < yj, with yj = uj1(r)=u1(cf), otherwise x increases (and eventually
reaches one) if y > yj. In words, a high enough population of Forgivers makes
the Cheaters survive and thrive, a high enough population of Punishers makes the
Cheaters die and the Responsible thrive. Note that yC 2 (0; 1) and that yA > 1,
hence:
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Lemma 1 For each economy in isolation there are two types of steady states in C
games. Steady state 1: all Cheaters and Forgivers (x = 1; y = 1); and Steady
state 2: all Responsible rst movers and a mass (1  y2) of Punishers: x = 0; y2 2
0; yC

: In A games only Steady state 2 exists.
Proof. Omitted.
To understand the above result, note that any mutation in a population that
arrived to steady state 1, e.g. a small percentage of Punishers or of Responsible
agents, would die out. Similarly, any mutation in a population that arrived to steady
state 2, e.g. a small percentage of Cheaters rst movers would die out because they
faced costly Punishment (this punishment is costly to the second movers as well).
Here is an illustration of the evolution and of the two types of evolutionary stable
equilibria for C games (in which yC 2 (0; 1))
Figure 2: Evolutionary Dynamics and Steady-States
For A games there is only one type of equilibrium, as can be seen because the
horizontal boundary yj (dashed line) for j = A lies above 1.
Summarizing the above analysis, if a rst mover is presented with an A type
interaction, he always acts honestly regardless of the second mover response. In
steady state, if a rst mover is presented with a C type interaction he may act
di¤erently depending on the environment: the propensity of an agent whose economy
has converged to steady state 2 is to act honestly and the propensity of an agent
whose economy of observation has converged to steady state 1 is to cheat. This
is supported by the di¤erent propensities of second movers to punish in di¤erent
cultures, as prescribed by the di¤erent evolutionary stable strategies in C games.
The di¤erent steady states represent di¤erent cultures that may prevail in di¤erent
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countries. In particular, we think of steady state 1 as the Greek steady state
characterized by cheating and forgiving and of steady state 2 as the German steady
statecharacterized by a high level of punishment and no cheating.
3.4 Merging Cultures: Economic Union
We want to analyze here the welfare e¤ects of an economic union, as when countries,
such as Greece and Germany for instance, decide to join a new single currency area.
This situation corresponds to one in which transactions between players (agents and
principals) of two countries previously isolated (or with large frictions making cross-
country matches unlikely or undesirable) become all of a sudden much more frequent.
Our rst goal is to understand what happens when interactions between agents of
these two culturally di¤erent countries emerge in the absence of new institutions
appropriately created to regulate or mediate these new interactions.
We label with superscript k = 1; 2 the country which converged to steady state k
in the C game, i.e. the country with culture k: Namely, think of Greece as country
1 and Germany as country 2, for instance. The cultural diversity between the two
economies that reached the two di¤erent steady states in C interactions can be dened
as D  (1  y2): When the two economies are separate, their welfare is
U1 = 
 
uA1 (r) + u
A
2 (r)

+ (1  ) (u1(cf) + u2(cf))
U2 = 
 
uA1 (r) + u
A
2 (r)

+ (1  )  uC1 (r) + uC2 (r)
Lemma 2 For any  2 (0; 1): 1. U2 > U1; 2. dUk
d
> 0 8k; 3. d(U
2 U1)
d
< 0
Proof. Omitted.
Consider now the problem of merging the two economies. The matches between
players of di¤erent cultures may provoke what we call a cultural clash: when an
agent coming from culture 1 interacts with a principal from culture 2, and they
match up in a C game, their actions clash, generating an ine¢ cient cheating and
punishment outcome. This outcome is costly for both players and yields the worst
possible outcome. We characterize now the total welfare from integration.
Proposition 1 The total welfare from an economic union decreases with: cultural
di¤erence D; the frequency of C games (1  ); and, if N2 > N1, the relative size of
the populations N1=N2:
Proof. See Appendix.
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This simple result establishes that the cultural clash due to economic integration
of countries is costly, and it qualies when it is more costly. The cultural clash is
stronger the greater the cultural di¤erence between countries 1 and 2, as it generates
more Cheat-Punish welfare reducing matches. Moreover, the cultural clash between
1 and 2 is exacerbated during bad times when the cheating prone C matches become
more frequent. 13
Economic integration of countries 1 and 2 typically generates a surplus due to
additional gains from trade. Only if there is an enlargement of the total available
opportunities due to economies of scale or scope, can both countries enjoy mutual
benet from merging the economies. The surplus boost from the economic union
can be easily modelled with a surplus multiplier parameter (say,  > 1), which has
the e¤ect of scaling up the payo¤ from cross country interactions.14 The presence
of a surplus multiplier ( > 1) mitigates the e¤ect of the cultural clash as it en-
hances payo¤s when the clash does not arise, while not mitigating the frequency
of the clashes. Absent this additional surplus creation, forming an economic union
would make sense possibly for country 1 (Greece), but not for country 2 (Germany).
Namely, it is easy to show that if an economic union does not imply additional sur-
plus ( = 1), then the citizens of 1 are the only ones that may benet from the
union.15
3.5 From Culture to Institutions: Political Union
We assume now that the di¤erent cultures translate into di¤erent institutions in
countries 1 and 2. In particular, culture 1 with higher forgiveness (Greece) breeds
institutions with looser rules and/or less e¢ cient enforcement of these rules, while
culture 2 of higher punishment (Germany) breeds institutions with stricter rules
and/or more stringent enforcement of these rules.16 In each country the principal is
13Thirdly, the welfare improves the larger N2=N1, as long as N2 > N1: If on the contrary
N2 < N1; then increasing N2 while improving responsible actions, exacerbates the cultural clash
(i.e. the frequency of cheat-punish matches) hence may reduce welfare.
14Alternatively we could assume that not only the cross-country ones but all interactions are
scaled up with the union. This would not change our results.
15Intuitively, from matching with a rst mover from a responsible culture in a C game, a prin-
cipal from the opposite culture always benets with respect to "matching at home"; but matching
with principals with the punishing culture the agents from a cheating culture su¤er an expected
punishment loss, which is smaller the more lenient are the institutions and private agents of the
responsible culture.
16This assumption can be seen, for instance, as a reduced form of a full edged model where par-
ents choose optimally the cultural norms to transmit to their kids given the amount of enforcement
chosen by the available institutions and the latter is chosen through voting, given the prevailing
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now the government who sets its own institution according to the prevailing culture
in his country. Hence, the two di¤erent institutions, corresponding to the previously
described steady-states 1 and 2, are:
I1 = 1; I2 = y2:
If in country k the governments enforcement of punishment is relegated to its cor-
responding institution Ik17 then the evolution of the propensity to cheat x can be
written as
_x
x
= u1(cf)
 
Ik   yj

(1  x)
Namely, the level of punishment by the principal is replaced by the country-specic
institution Ik. The two di¤erent institutions I1 and I2 have impact on economic
outcomes in C games but not in A games, as respectively:
yA  1  Ik; I1  yC  I2
Hence in C interactions the evolution of the propensity to bypass the rules x is
di¤erent in countries 1 and 2. That is, cheating behavior in bad times may thrive 
xC ! 1 in Greece where institution I1 = 1 is characterized by leniency and low
enforcement of rules, but not in Germany where institution I2 = y2 is characterized
by a higher level of punishment/enforcement causing cheaters to disappear in the
long run
 
xC ! 0 :
An economic union involves a slow and costly adjustment process, due to the fact
that agents country 1 may clash in C games with institutions of country 2, and vice
versa. Therefore an agreement that replaces the local institutions with a new set
of appropriately designed institutions is desirable to mitigate the clash. A political
union, involves the creation of new institutions which, among other functions, have
the crucial role of enforcement authority. The extent of such authority should be
agreed upon by all member countries in the political union.
We show that countries 1 and 2 would benet from choosing a political union
with a joint intermediate institution I 0, providing a level of punishment/enforcement
intermediate between the two countries. Political union may be benecial even if
the new authority entails a cost S > 0 which can be thought of as both the cost
norms. Tabellini (2008b) shows that in equilibrium communities with strong norms of cooperation
choose high level of enforcement, and vice versa, in communities with high enforcement (strong
institutions) families choose tight norms of cooperation.
17This idea of people from one culture clashing with mis-matched institution links closely with
the work on identity (see Akerlof and Kranton (2000))
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of creation of such an institution and the cost of lost sovereignty.18 The higher the
initial cultural di¤erence D, the greater the space of parameters where an authority
with exogenous forgiveness I 0 can be benecial.
Proposition 2 (I) A necessary condition for two countries in an economic union
to prefer the creation of a new enforcement authority I 0 is I 0  y2. (II) Conditional
on adding a common enforcement authority I 0  y2, the utilitarian welfare of such
an institutional addition is increasing in (1  ) and in the cultural distance .
Proof. See Appendix.
The above proposition avoids making precise statements about what the "opti-
mal" institution I 0 is, whenever there exist conditions for the desirability of a common
enforcement authority. In fact, such an "optimal" institution depends on several fac-
tors, such as the importance of the long run versus short run or the discount factor.
Given the evolution of x, i.e.,
_x
x
= u1(cf)
 
Ik   yj

(1  x)
the dependence of the optimal institution on  is clear: In bad times yC(< 1) matters
more frequently, hence the ideal institution is I 0 = yC , as this institution mitigates the
clash (short run concern) while at the same time preventing cheating behavior x from
growing to the ine¢ cient steady state 2 (long run concern). In good times yA(> 1)
matters more frequently, hence the cheating rate x drops to zero regardless (steady
state 2) hence there is no long run concern, but milder institutions that mitigate the
(less frequent) clash today also a¤ect the speed of convergence to steady state 2.
3.6 Discussion: which Union is Preferable?
The advantage of a newly created institution is that it guarantees a mutually agreed
upon enforcement level, such that clashes between agents of country 1 following cul-
tural norm 1 and institutions of country 2 based on cultural norm 2 can be mitigated,
and conversely.19 Of course, the main cost of a supra-national institution is a partial
18The literature in political economy is full of seminal works emphasizing the importance of
strategically targeting di¤erent groups in society see e.g. Lindbeck and Weibul (1987), Dixit and
Londregan (1995), Lizzeri and Persico (2001). Giving up scal policy determination is therefore
costly for politicians.
19Another argument for a more integrated union that comes out of this framework is a reduction
in the number of bilateral relationships that need to work out. If, e.g., we have N principals and one
agent, and some distribution of cultural norms across principals, then mechanically the likelihood
of a cultural clash increases with N. Instead, in a political union there is only one principal. We
thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
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loss of sovereignty. If  is expected to be high (good economic perspectives), the
cultural clash, which applies to C games only, is unlikely to worry countriesleaders
enough to pay the cost of lost sovereignty: a high enough expected  is enough to
rationalize a union where no international new institutions are created to regulate
the new matches, i.e. no political union. However, if ex post an unanticipated eco-
nomic crisis hits the area, i.e.  is revealed to be low, then the cultural clashes may
surface as a major and salient issue. When a lower  materializes, countries may
realize that the economic union needs to be complemented by a political union with
new common institutions or, as a last resort, reverting to separate economies. Even
if such an option of going back is available (an option which might be very costly
as exit strategies have not been anticipated in the original design), the decision to
form new institutions to mitigate the cultural clash may be preferable in some cases
even if it entails loss of sovereignty. In particular, if a crisis (low realization of ) is
perceived to be temporary, the need for new institutions is less important, but if 
low is perceived to be permanent, then the need for new institutions is paramount.
4 Cultural Clash in the Euro Area
We will now apply the simple theory of culture and institutions developed in the
previous section to an important and recent cultural clash in the Euro area and
relate it to the Euro area prolonged economic crisis.
4.1 Evidence of cultural di¤erence between Greece and Ger-
many
We start by documenting a signicant cultural distance between Germany and Greece
- a precondition for the cultural clash.20 Table 1 panel A shows summary statistics
on several measures of cultural traits in a sample of Germans and a sample of Greeks
taken from the World Values Survey. We report about three sets of values and beliefs:
measures of civic values, measures of cultural norms constructed by Tabellini (2008a)
and a measure of people trust in other fellow citizens. The last two columns report the
di¤erence in these measures between Germany and Greece and the value of the t-test
for the di¤erences. The table documents a remarkable systematic di¤erence between
the values that are shared by the Germans and those shared by the Greeks: with the
20Similar di¤erences (and potential clashes) can probably be documented for other bilateral com-
parisons between other northern and southern countries in the Euro zone (see Buetzer et al (2012)
for evidence), but the Greece Germany clash is the most evident, as documented in the text.
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exception of whether accepting a bribe is justiable (which is equally not justiable
in Germany as in Greece) all other values are highly statistically di¤erent in the
two countries. The Germans tend to have higher civic values and stronger cultural
traits (respect, obedience an control) that ought to encourage welfare enhancing
social interactions (Tabellini, 2008a). Furthermore, the Germans tend to trust other
Germans more than the Greeks trust other Greeks by a large margin (14 percentage
points more).
However, these data do not say much on whether and how the two populations
di¤er in their attitudes when it comes to the decision to punish others, a feature
which seems to have played a critical role in a¤ecting Germanys position on how
to manage the Greek crisis. Panel B sheds some light on this. It shows answers
provided by the Greeks and the Germans to three questions asked in the European
Social Survey that reveal their willingness to punish (or help the punishment of)
wrongdoers. The rst is: "How likely are you to call the police if you see a man
get his wallet stolen?", the second, "How willing are you to identify the person who
had done it?", the third "How willing are you to give evidence in court against the
accused?". Answers are provided on a scale from 1 to 4, ranging from "not at all
willing" (coded 1) to "very willing" (coded 4).
On each of the three accounts the Germans are signicantly more willing to punish
wrongdoers than the Greeks. The di¤erence appears neatly in Figure 3 which shows
the distribution of the answers for the samples in the two countries. For example,
79% of the Germans compared to 59% of the Greeks are "very willing" to call the
police and 70% of the Germans are "very willing" to identify the person compared
to only 45% of the Greeks.
Yet, rather than reecting di¤erent cultures the di¤erence in willingness to report
and collaborate with the police or the court may reect other features - e.g. a
more e¢ cient German police which increases Germans motivation to collaborate as
they can see the benet of their e¤ort. A very interesting experiment conducted
by Herrmann et al. (2008) provides evidence that is free from this objection and is
thus able to isolate the cultural di¤erence. They run a public good game experiment
using 16 comparable participant samples from countries around the world, including
Greece and Germany. The public good game aims at mimicking situations that
require some degree of cooperation to achieve a socially benecial outcome - as with
the nancing of a public good. They endowed participants with 20 tokens and let
them play in groups of four. Each participant had to decide how many tokens
to keep for themselves and how many to contribute to a group project. As with
typical public good games payo¤s are such that keeping all own tokens was always
in any participants material individual interest, irrespective of how much the other
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three group members contributed. Besides the contribution decision, in one of the
treatments of the games each participant was given also the possibility to punish each
of the other group members after they were informed about the otherscontributions
to the public investment. The punishment was in the form of an economic loss
imposed on the punished by the punisher, who retained his anonymity.
When no punishment is available the Germans tend to contribute more to the
public good than the Greeks, thus showing that the latter tend to free ride more
frequently. The Germans produce more public good than the Greeks. When players
are given the possibility to punish the other players upon seeing their contributions,
what they nd is striking. The Germans overwhelmingly use part of their endowment
to punish those who contributed less. The Greeks, on the contrary, not only do not
punish those who free ride but tend instead to punish those who contribute more than
them! That is, they exhibit what Herrmann et al. (2008) label antisocial punishment.
Put di¤erently, Germany seems to be characterized by a culture of responsibility
and social punishment that endows people with behavioral rules that ask them to
contribute to the public good and to punish those who do not, thus providing a
mechanism to enforce cooperative behavior. In Greece it seems to prevail a weak
culture of cooperation that justies free riding behavior and where cooperators, not
free riders, are given a hard time. It may not sound surprising that these two cultures
may clash when forced to interact with each other as the management of a nancial
crisis under a common currency requires.
4.2 Cultural clash consequences: Greek crisis mismanage-
ment
The cultural distance described above generates, according to our model, opportuni-
ties for costly cultural clashes, that we claim to be responsible for some key aspects
which exacerbated and prolonged the Euro area crisis. We rst briey relate the
mismanagement of the Greek crisis to the cultural clash; then we discuss various
sources of evidence about the empirical relevance of the cultural clash elements; -
nally, we compare the cultural clash view with alternative explanations; we conclude
this section with some references to the current debate on the necessity of common
agencies determining banking union and scal union, namely political institutions
beyond the simple economic and monetary union.
The Greek debt crisis, which subsequently triggered the European sovereign debt
crisis, started after the announcement in October 2009 that Greece government
decit was twice as large as the gure reported by the previous government - de
facto admitting that the government cheated on the budget. This announcement
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was immediately followed by a widening of bond yield spreads (Figure 6) vis a vis
Germany, starting a condence crisis. In a matter of months Greek government debt
was downgraded to junk bond status (April 2010) and rates on bonds climbed re-
ecting that private capital markets practically were no longer accessible for Greece,
forcing a rst aid package to Greece in May 2010. There is widespread agreement
that governments in Europe mismanaged the crisis, showing rst an unwillingness
to intervene promptly when the Greek crisis started and was still manageable and
never willing to devote enough resources to make sure that intervention could be res-
olute and nal (see among others, Johnson, 2010; Pisani-Ferry, 2012; Eichengreen,
2013; Wren-Lewis, 2013). Ine¢ cient management was lately admitted by the IMF
in a June 2013 strictly condential report leaked to the Wall Street Journal. Besides
recognizing that the plan understated the macroeconomic impact of the austerity
measures imposed on Greece, it is stressed that frictions among the leading Euro-
pean countries were behind the late reaction. In particular, it appears that Germany
was paralyzed and afraid of breaking a tabu: helping an euro area country that was
very likely insolvent. As Rajan (2012) puts it European politicians are failing Eu-
rope by being forever behind the curve. Why do they nd it so hard to lead?. The
answer he provides to the question he raises is that when faced with novel problems
that the public has never experienced before, policy makers may fail because they
may not have the mandate to tackle them. Even if policy makers perfectly foresee the
adverse consequences of a problem (such as a delayed reaction to the Greek crisis), it
may be hard to convince the electors that it is worth incurring the short term cost of
intervention (e.g. nancial help to Greece). Lack of past experience prevents electors
to assess the size of these costs and only an appreciation of the latter can convince
them to o¤er the necessary consensus for policy makers to act. In other words, even
if politicians are fully aware of the disaster that awaits if nothing is done...they
may have little ability to persuade voters: talk is cheap and, in the absence of evi-
dence to the contrary, the status quo usually appears comfortable enough. Rajans
explanation rests on two ingredients: a) prompt action was not feasible for lack of
consensus and the latter is needed to set policy in motion; b) voters may fail to see
the general equilibrium consequences of their unwillingness to bear the short run cost
of intervention which politicians can instead see. Our explanation provides a ground
for both ingredients: voters reactions are guided by (automatic) application of cul-
tural norms; politicians fail because, being subject to the conformity of institutions
to culture, they cannot bypass the prevailing votersopinions.
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4.3 Evidence in support of the cultural clash explanation
4.3.1 Evidence from polls
We use two recurrent polls sponsored by public TV stations. The ARD, which runs
the Deutschland-TREND survey, and the ZDF sponsors Politbarometer survey data
gathering information on German citizens feelings and opinions about the manage-
ment of the crisis as well as condence and support for their leader Angela Merkel.
Table 2 shows answers provided by participants in the polls to di¤erent type of ques-
tions asked at various points in time between 2010 and 2011; we have organized
these questions in groups according to topic and numbered them for ease of refer-
ence. Some of these questions have been asked also at various times in 2012 with
very similar patterns of responses. The rst set of questions (1 to 6) shows peo-
plesopinions about whether Greece deserves being helped and how Greece should
be treated. Already in February 2010, few months after it became public that the
previous Greek government cheated on the budget and when the debate was around
the potential size of the aid required to avoid Greeces default, a poll by Emnid
reveals that 67% of the Germans oppose any aid (question 1). Again, in July 2011,
when governments were discussing about the second tranche of transfers to Greece,
the vast majority of the Germans (60%) is against giving Greece a second round of
rescue loans (question 1) and in October they continue to express a negative opinion
about whether the other European governments (not the German) should continue
to give support to Greece. In addition, more than 80% report that Greece should be
forced to leave the Euro if it did not accept the decisions on the euro rescue (ques-
tion 3). The pattern of answers is consistent with the idea that the opinions of the
Germans were guided by the desire to punish the Greeks (or Greece) for their Gov-
ernments deceptive behavior. Interestingly, we can exclude that these opinions are
driven by stereotypes towards the Mediterranean countries because the vast majority
of the Germans (70%) when asked in September 2011 support the idea that Germany
helps economically Libyas reconstruction following the liberation war fought against
Gadda(question 8). And we can also exclude that the opposition to support Greece
reects a generic punishment towards European countries with problematic public
nances, because when the Germans are asked which country among the PIIGS
should be allowed to continue to be part of the Euro area, only a minority of them
report that Greece should remain in the Euro while the vast majority answers that
Spain, Italy and Ireland should stay in the Euro (with percentages in support of each
country equal to 77%, 73% and 67% respectively; question 5). It seems again that
it is the desire to punish Greece that leads the vast majority of the Germans (77%,
question 8) to dislike the expansion of the funds of the European Financial Stability
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Fund.
This is further conrmed by the Pew Research Center report who asks a sample
of Germans to report whether they have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, unfa-
vorable or very unfavorable opinion of Greece and several other European countries.
In the Spring of 2010, 70% of the Germans have an unfavorable opinion of Greece
and this is even higher two years later in the Spring of 2012 (79%, Table 3). Germans
have instead only mild unfavorable opinions towards Italy and Spain despite their
troubled public nances: in the Spring of 2012, 33% of Germans have an unfavor-
able opinion of Italy and 26% of Spain and these opinions are not di¤erent from
those expressed in early 2010 when the sovereign debt crisis had not yet extended
to these countries. Interestingly, the judgement of the Germans vis a vis Italy and
Spain is not di¤erent from the opinion they have of the British (Table 3, Panel A),
again suggesting that Germansunfavorable opinion of the Greeks reects a specic
reaction in Germany to the cheating behavior of the Greek government rather than
a judgement for the high level of debt of poorly performing economies during the
European sovereign debt crisis.
These sentiments, besides being widespread among representative samples of the
general population and thus very likely to reect the opinions of the German median
voter, are shared also by specic segments of the German population, namely the
business community which was particularly sensitive to a quick resolution of the
Greek crisis. As Figure 4 shows, in December 2012 the vast majority of the German
managers (81%) think that the most serious risks for the German economy come
from the euro crisis (Panel A); at the same time two out of three argue that the best
response to this crisis is to impose heavier sanctions to the debt transgressors - that
is to punish Greece.21
21There also several pieces of casual evidence suggesting that cultural factors are an integral part
of the way Germany has handled the Greek crisis. An interesting one is the following reconstruction
of Thomas Wiesers interpretation of the German government behavior in the management of the
crisis. At the time, Thomas Wieser is the Chairmen of the Economic and Financial Committee of
the European Union. The committee in charge of preparing the agenda for the European Finance
meetings where negotiations on how to tackle the European sovereign debt crises take place. In
private talks he has argued that all the problems that Europe has faced in dealing with the Greek
crisis can be explained in terms of religious background, and has provided the following rationale. In
countries with a relevant presence of Protestantism, such as Germany, moral and religious precepts
are so severe that one will never be forgiven for his sins, nor will people grant forgiveness to the
sinners. In Catholic dominated countries, such as Italy, Spain, Portugal and Ireland - four of the
ve PIIGS - behavior is such that if one sins he/she can always be forgiven if he/she repents and so
make it into paradise. Finally, according to Wieser, Orthodox religion is so loose that in countries
dominated by it - of which Greece is the leading one - if one sins there is not even a need for
him/her to repent to make it into paradise. This story is perfectly consistent with ours but goes a
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These opinions, we argue, have to be followed by Mrs. Merkel who is bound by
the conformity constraint. One then expects that if she conforms to the constraint
this should be reected in the consensus polls. Indeed, as Angela Merkel has insisted
in her severe policy towards Greece22, approval of her policy has increased steadily:
in September 2011 45% of the Germans were satised with the way Angela Merkel
was handling the crisis; the proportion increases to 56% in November 2011 and 80%
in the Spring of 2012 (Table 2, question 9).23
In general, direct evidence of the conformity constraint is hard to obtain. One
piece of such evidence is the request that Germanys Finance Minister during the
crisis, autarchy Schauble, made to Timothy Geithner - US secretary of the Treasury
at the time - to support Germany in kicking Greece out of the Euro. In his book,
Geithner (2014) reports the he met Schauble in July 2012 at the peak of the crisis
who argued that there where many in Europe who "thought kicking the Greeks out
of the Eurozone was a plausible - even desirable - strategy". Geithner writes that
Schauble justied the proposal by arguing that "..with Greece out, Germany would
have been more likely to provide the nancial support the Eurozone needed, because
the German people would no longer perceive aid to Europe as a bailout for the Greeks"
(p. 483, italics added). This is both consistent with a German/Greek cultural clash
and the conformity constraint.
Finally, if punishment by the Germans has played a role in the management of
the crisis, then one would expect: a) that since people do not like to be punished,
we should observe some resentment of the "punished" - the Greeks - towards the
"punisher" - the Germans. This should be even more true if the culture of the
step further, as it provides a rationale for why the Germans feel obliged to punish the Greeks (the
sinners) and why the Greeks cheated on the budget: their religious background, dominated by
Protestantism in Germany and by the Orthodox church in Greece.
Another piece (among many) was reported by the Berlin correspondent from the Italian daily
newspaper "La Stampa" who reports casual evidence from the Berlin commercial rental market.
Opening now a shop in the crowded streets of Prenzlauer Bergin Berlin costs di¤erently depending
on nationality: Germans and Dutch pay 3 months of rent as advance payment; French 6 months;
club medcountries 12 months, except Greeks who must pay 18 months upfront.
22Mrs Merkel severe policy culminated in January 2012 in a proposal made informally to the other
member countries of the Eurozone to appoint a European commissioner with veto power on budget
decisions taken by the Greek government - Financial Times, January 27 2012 - as a condition for
approving the new rescue plan; this proposal was subsequently openly supported by the President
of the ECB -Spiegel, Octber 28 2012.
23Interestingly, since Merkels behavior in this case is dictated by the conformity constraints, her
popularity is not a reection of consensus to her party, which in fact shows little change (Table
2, question 10). Likewise, the fact that the Greek voters "punished" Papandreu in 2012 elections
rather than the conservative party that was responsible for cheating on the budget and thus for the
subsequent German reaction.
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punished in one of forgiveness rather than punishment, so that the latter will look
unjust or excessive - another symptom of the cultural clash; b) the unfavorable
opinions towards Greece should be stronger in countries with a stronger culture of
punishment.
As for the rst implication, according to the Pew Research Center May 2012
Global Attitudes Report, anti-German sentiment has become prevalent in Greece,
where a majority (78%) has an unfavorable opinion of Germany, and nearly half
(49%) of the Greeks say they have a very unfavorable view. This contrasts with
the fact that in all the other countries sampled (except the UK) Germany scores
the lowest fraction of unfavorable opinions (Table 3, Panels C-F). Greece is the only
country where a majority (84%) thinks German Chancellor Angela Merkel is doing
a bad job dealing with the economic crisis. And they are intensely critical: 57% say
she is doing a very bad job and the Greeks are the least likely among Europeans
surveyed to say the Germans are hardworking.
To provide some suggestive evidence on the second implication we correlate the
share of people of di¤erent European countries that, according to Pew Research have
an unfavorable opinion of Greece in the Spring of 2012 with the share of people that
are ready to participate in punishing. As a proxy for the latter we use the share of
people in each country that say they are very likely to call the police if they see a
man get his wallet stolen (see Table 1, Panel B). As shown in Figure 5, though based
on very few observations, the correlation is clearly positive (correlation coe¢ cient =
0.57), and is thus consistent with this implication.
4.3.2 Cultural Clash pre-crisis?
Since the evidence discussed so far draws on views expressed in the months after Jan-
uary 2010, it may be argued that the unfavorable opinions that the Germans have of
the Greeks vis-a-vis the other PIIGS reect an anti-Greek sentiment of the Germans
that pre-dates the crisis rather than the Germans cultural reaction to the deceptive
behavior of the Greeks. And a similar objection could be raised for the unfavorable
opinions that the Greeks have of the Germans. Unfortunately the questions summa-
rized in the previous tables were only asked after the discovery that Greece cheated
on the budget. To address this objection we use data on bilateral trust - that is
the trust citizens in a European country have towards citizens of another European
country - collected by Eurobarometer well before the Great Recession and countries
opinions about Greece admission to the European Union at the end of 1980. In a
sequence of surveys run up to 1995 Eurobarometer has asked participants in the
survey the following question : I would like to ask you a question about how much
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trust you have in people from various countries. For each, please tell me whether
you have a lot of trust, some trust, not very much trust or no trust at all". Details
about the surveys are reported in Guiso et al (2009). To summarize the answers
we have computed the average percentage share of Germans and Greeks that report
they trust a lot people of each of the other countries included in Eurobarometer.
Table 4 shows this measures of trust for the average of all countries (last row) and
for a selected group of countries that overlap as much as possible with those in Table
3.
Interestingly, 11% of the Germans report that they trust the Greeks a lot - a gure
that is somewhat below how much the Germans trust on average people of all other
European countries (16%), but higher than the trust they have towards the Italians
(8%) and comparable to the trust they have towards the Portuguese (11%) and the
Irish (13%). This suggests that there was no specic unfavorable view of the Germans
towards the Greeks before the specic event - the cheating on Greece budget - that
has triggered the crisis. Similarly, there was no pre-existing unfavorable Greek view
towards the Germans: 18% of the Greeks trusted the Germans a lot, somewhat above
how much the Greeks trusted other Europeans (last row of Table 4) and more than
the trust the Greeks had towards the Italians, the British or the Portuguese. Thus,
the Greeks unfavorable judgment towards the Germans in 2012 that we document in
Table 3 is likely to reect not a pre-existing Greek anti-German sentiment but the
reaction to the German punishment. This conclusion is further strengthened by the
evidence in Figure 7 showing the fraction of people in various countries that in 1980
argue that Greece entry into the EU is a good thing. Interestingly, the Germans are,
after the Italians the strongest supporters of Greece admission.
4.4 Dealing with alternative explanations
In this section we discuss possible alternative and more standard explanations behind
the ine¢ cient delay in managing the Greek crisis. Our purpose is not to dismiss
these factors and argue that they were unimportant, but rather to show that what
we interpret as a cultural clash is not just the reection of some other force.
4.4.1 Di¤erent incentives to save Greece
A rst objection to our proposed explanation is that countries had di¤erent incentives
to save Greece because they could have been di¤erentially a¤ected by a propagation
of the Greek crisis; namely, the Mediterranean countries had stronger incentives to
bail out Greece because they feared a contagion of the crisis while this fear was absent
in Germany. Hence, Germany could safely (and selshly) oppose costly transfers for
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the German taxpayer, and the Germans hostile opinions towards Greece just masks
these economic incentives. To address this objection notice rst that the di¤erent
reaction of the Germans (and the position of the German government on the Greek
crisis) compared to that of other European citizens/governments emerges soon after
it becomes public that Greece cheated on the budget. As shown in Table 2, (rst
row), already in February 2010 the vast majority of the Germans oppose transfers
to Greece. At the time, however, interest rate spreads show no evidence of a risk
of contagion to other European countries, with or without budget problems. Figure
6 compares the spread on the Greek 10-year government bond with respect to the
German Bund with that of the other PIIGS (Panel A) and of France (Panel B).
Greece spread starts to increase right after the new Socialist government announced
in October 2009 that the true decit was about twice as large as the gure di¤used
by the previous government (the rst vertical line). The spread of the other PIIGS,
however, shows initially little change. For instance, up until March 2010, while
Greece spread increases by about 300 basis points, Ireland spread is constant or
slightly decreasing. The spread of PIIGS starts to increase in proximity of and right
after the adoption of the rst aid package in April-May 2010, suggesting that markets
fear of contagion as reected in the spreads was induced by a perceived failure of the
bail out policy. Another and perhaps more compelling way to address the objection
is to notice that it cannot explain the di¤erent views of the French and the Germans
vis a vis Greece. France spread is essentially at all through until June 2011, that is
until the Greek crisis evolves into an Euro crisis. Until then, markets anticipate no
risk of contagion to France. Hence, France and Germany are, along these dimension
fully comparable. Yet, Germans sentiments are much more unfavorable to Greece
than French sentiments already in the Spring of 2010: while 35% of the French have
an unfavorable opinion of Greece the fraction of unfavorable is twice as large among
the Germans (see Table 3, Panel A and Panel C). This is instead consistent with
a German-Greek cultural clash, even more so in light of the fact the French have
a weaker attitude to punish than the Germans - as shown by the willingness to
participate in punishment (Table 1, Panel B).
A second concern is that the reaction of the Germans towards Greece compared
to that of other European countries may just reect a lower exposure of the German
banks (and German investors) to the Greek sovereign debt, weakening any incentive
Germany may have had to bail out Greece. However, the data seem to tell a di¤erent
story. At the end of 2009 French and German banks were in Europe the most exposed
to Greece, accounting for 76% of total Greek debt to European banks (split 53%
French banks and 22% German banks). The banks of these two countries together
held 66% of the Greek government debt in the hands or Euro area banks, of which
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28% held by German banks (Table 5). Thus, it was in Germanys interest, as much as
France, to push towards a bail out of Greece, sharing the cost with the other European
countries in proportion to their GDP. We see the opposite (it is Germany that more
than France and the other EU countries that opposed the bailout). The culture-based
explanation is instead consistent with the angry reaction of the Germans towards
Greece once they discovered that the debtor hid his ability to repay by concealing
the overall size of its decit.
4.4.2 Moral hazard stories
Another possibility is that Germany desire to "punish" Greece arises as an opti-
mal strategy to discipline future moral hazard by the Greeks (and indeed by any
other member of the union). Punishment may reect an ex ante agreement among
the members of the economic union to discipline countries that with their behavior
threaten the stability of the union. Without denying that moral hazard concerns
may have played a relevant role in the reluctance of some of the European countries
to help out Greece, we argue that it is unlikely that it can explain all without any
role for cultural clash considerations. In fact, the moral hazard story, literally taken,
implies that all countries should be involved and share the punishment strategy,
which seems to be contradicted by the tougher German positions.
A possible criticism to our explanation is that the cultural clash instead of stem-
ming from a clash of behavioral norms is the reection of the dominant economic
thinking in Germany that can be traced back to the ordo-liberalism principles (Schny-
der and Siems, 2013). These principles stress the importance of disciplining moral
hazard and containing debt. We have three answers to this criticism. First, this
criticism does not seem to question the role of a cultural clash as a relevant element
in the crisis, but whether it is a clash of economic ideas or a clash of interpersonal be-
havioral rules. Second, it raises the issue of why the ordo-liberalism principles emerge
and succeed in Germany; our answer would be that the "responsible/punisher" char-
acterization of the German culture is the ideal humus where these type of principles
can spread out. Third, the ordo-liberalism principles predict punishment of moral
hazard when countries run high debt; our characterization predicts punishment of
cheaters. The data are more consistent with our story: German sentiments deterio-
rated vis-a-vis Greece when it was discovered that they cheated. Their view about
Italy, whose debt was high and increasing during the crisis, do not show a comparable
deterioration.
Second, the moral hazard story has an implication for the time prole of Germans
sentiments that di¤ers from the cultural clash explanation. Under moral hazard,
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Germanssentiments towards Greece should be mitigated by the introduction of the
balance budget rules and more severe monitoring of future scal policies in member
countries adopted with the Fiscal Compact agreement in the Spring of 2012. Under
the cultural clash explanation because these sentiments are a reaction to the past
behavior of the Greeks, they should either be constant or even amplied by the bail
out packages decided meanwhile. The data in Table 3, Panel A seem to be more
consistent with the latter than with the former explanation: if anything, Germans
views towards Greece have deteriorated between the Spring of 2010 and that of 2012.
In a recent article, Ardagna and Caselli (2012) have pointed out the di¢ culties
of negotiations among heads of States at the European Council as a potential source
of ine¢ cient solutions for the Greek crisis, and they conclude that perhaps the best
way to avoid negotiation-related political economic frictions would have been to let
the IMF handle the Greek crisis. The type of political economy failures we identify
are di¤erent and so is the solution: the failures stem from heterogeneous cultures,
and the clash that this heterogeneity in culture creates would be best addressed by
the creation of a new type of institution - like a political/scal union - free from the
need to conform to the culture of any single country in the union. At the positive
analysis level, we do not think the friction was (mainly) one of negotiation costs,
because from the beginning the problem has basically been "what does Germany
think", which therefore concerns more understanding Germany than understanding
the negotiation process between Euro-area heads of state. At the normative analysis
level, the cultural reasons why the Germans do not want to save the Greeks un-
less the Greekssovereignty is suspended have to do with moral hazard (cheating
expectations), and hence Germany would have opposed such saving even through
the IMF. On the other hand, a scal union, which means elimination of the game
between sovereign States, would nd Germany more willing to help as less concerned
by future moral hazard issues and Greeces debt default less unforgivable. In other
words, while IMF would still make donors upset about helping out countries who
could be prone to moral hazard, going for a scal union that requires transfer of
power from national nance ministers to a European nance minister would avoid
the ine¢ cient punishments as well as the risk of moral hazard and hence the related
worries and cultural clashes.
4.5 Current debate on the future of the Euro area
Our model suggests that the creation of a monetary union without a scal/political
union can be justied in a scenario of optimism regarding the incidence/frequency
of interests aligned interactions and the value of integration in terms of economies of
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scale and/or scope. However, we have also shown that the presence of a cultural clash
and a crisis together may determine an impetus towards the creation of new common
institutions, like a scal union or banking union. The current political debate in
Europe is consistent with this implication of the theoretical model. Indeed, with
the aggravation of the euro area crisis, the scal union seems to have become again
a policy option, advocated by scholars (see, among others, Marzinotto, Sapir and
Wol¤ (2011) and Ferguson and Barbieri (2012) and policy makers. During the crisis,
Trichet (2011) was the rst to openly speak about the creation of a European Finance
Minister. Interestingly, and consistent with our model, the European Ministry of
Finance, as Trichet stresses is not necessarily a ministry of nance that administers
a large federal budget; its main role is in fact to move power from the national
countries - Germany and Greece in our simplied set up - so as to avoid the impasse
caused, in our interpretation, by the cultural clash. That the motivation for relying
on a scal union to address the current euro crisis is not exclusively driven by an
insurance motive, but by a governance motive, as in our model, is also supported by
the German view on the issue. Germany conceives the scal union as a set of new
rules that help prevent future crisis and clashes (see the view expressed by Ludger
Schuknecht, the director general for Interlineation Fiscal, Financial and Monetary
Policy at the German Ministry of Finance, 2013).
5 Conclusions
Cultural norms can a¤ect economic outcomes through several channels, indeed they
a¤ect many layers of society: private relationships, institutional di¤erences and
elected policy makers as well. Cultural clashes become salient whenever two (or
more) cultures have to merge in terms of economic activities. The cultural di¤er-
ence and the di¤erent behaviors that each culture commands can result in a political
impasse. Though policy makers are bound by the cultural norms over which they
have no control and that evolve slowly, they can still design common institutions
which can temper the e¤ects of the clash. We apply these ideas to shed light on the
(mis)-management of the European sovereign debt crisis. Besides rationalizing the
German/Greek contrast and why Germany has shown resistance to bail Greece out,
our model has much more general features regarding the interplay between culture
and institutions. In our set up the slow moving nature of cultural norms should
be sped up through a process of convergence of institutions when the cultural clash
results in particularly costly outcomes, such as political stalemates which prolong
and exacerbate a crisis.
About the desirability of a political union in general, and hence scal union
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or banking union in Europe in particular, we have highlighted several conceptual
points. First and most importantly, a political unions main role is to replace multiple
authorities subject to cultural clash with a unique new authority, hence facilitating
convergence, commitment, and enforcement. Second, an important message of the
paper is that the value of a political unication is greater the higher the cultural
heterogeneity.
31
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. The payo¤ (average tness) for a merged population
(under an economic union (U)), characterized by the population (x0; y0) in a C game,
is for each mover:
U1UC = u
C
1 (r)(1  x0) + u1(cf)x0y0; U2UC = uC2 (r)(1  x0) + u2(cf)x0y0
Hence total welfare in a C game is:
U
T
UC =
 
uC1 (r) + u
C
2 (r)

(1  x0) + (u1(cf) + u2(cf))x0y0
If the population of the country with culture k = 1; 2 is Nk, we have:
x0 =
N1
N1 +N2
; y0 =
N1 + y2N
2
N1 +N2
Hence total welfare is:
UTU = U
T
UA + (1  )UTUC
= 
 
uA1 (r) + u
A
2 (r)

+ (1  )
"  
uC1 (r) + u
C
2 (r)

N2
N1+N2
+(u1(cf) + u2(cf))
(N1+y2N2)N1
(N1+N2)2
#
so it is decreasing in D = (1  y2) and in :
Total welfare depends on the population sizes only through the ratio N2=N1,
namely (omitting the term independent from N2=N1) we have:
UTU / (1  )
 
uC1 (r) + u
C
2 (r)
 N2=N1
1 +N2=N1
+ (u1(cf) + u2(cf))
1 + y2 (N
2=N1)
(1 +N2=N1)2

It is easy to show that the rst term is increasing in N2=N1 always, the second
term is increasing if y2 > 2N
1 N2
N1
:
Proof of Proposition 2. A political union is preferred by both countries if the
gain over the economic union exceeds the cost S of the State-like union creation.
Namely24
U1SU   U1U = (1  ) (I 0   y2)u1(cf)
N2
N1 +N2
> S
U2SU   U2U = (1  ) (I 0   y2)u2(cf)
N1
N1 +N2
> S
24Recall that the subscript k = 1; 2 in Uk refers to the country that reached steady state k before
the merger.
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Tables and Figures  
 
Table 1. Greece and Germany: cultural difference 
  
The table documents differences in a set of cultural traits between Germany and Greece. 
Panel A shows three measures of civic values (attitudes towards: a) claiming government 
benefits one is not entitled to; b) avoiding a fare on public transport; c) cheating on taxis); 
three measures of cultural traits adopted by Tabellini (2009) and a belief measure of 
culture (generalized trust towards fellow citizens). All these measures are obtained from 
the 1999-2000 World Values Survey (WVS). The measures of civic values are the 
answers to the question “Please tell me for each of the following actions whether you 
think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between”. Answers are 
on a scale between 1 and 10, where 10 means never justified and 1 always justified.   
“Obedience”, “Respect” and “Unselfishness”, are the fraction of respondents that  
mention these traits as being important to the question: “Here is a list of qualities that 
children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, if any, do you consider to be 
especially important? Please choose up to five”.  “Control” is the average response in 
each country to the question: “Some people feel they have completely free choice and 
control over their lives, while other people feel that what we do has no real effect on what 
happens to them. Please use this scale (from 1 to 10) where 1 means “none at all” and 10 
means “a great deal” to indicate how much freedom of choice and control in life you have 
over the way your life turns out”. “Trust” is the percentage of respondents who answer 
that “Most people can be trusted” to the question “Generally speaking, would you say 
that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?”. 
Panel B shows summary statistics of a specific cultural attitude – the attitude towards 
punishment – in Germany and Greece.  The three measures of willingness to punish 
wrongdoers are averages of the answers to the questions asked in the European Social 
Survey, Wave 2010 (Round 5) to a sample of 3031 Germans and 2715 Greeks: “Imagine 
that you were out and saw someone push a man to the ground and steal his wallet. A) 
How likely would you be to call the police to call the police? B) How willing would you 
be to identify the person who had done it?  C) How willing would you be to give 
evidence75 in court against the accused?”. Answers are on a scale between 1 (Not at all 
likely (willing)) and 4 (Very likely (willing)).  
 
A. Civic values, cultural norms and trust beliefs 
Variables Germany Greece Difference 
Germany-
Greece 
t-test for the 
difference 
Measures of civic values     
Claiming Government 
benefits you are not entitled 
to  
9.00 6.96 2.04 24.7 
Avoiding a fare on public 
transport 
9.04 7.57 1.47 19.19 
Cheating on taxes 8.63 7.83 0.80 9.27 
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Accept a bribe 9.06 9.07 -0.01 -014 
Tabellini (2009) cultural norms 
indicators 
    
Respect 0.71 0.52 0.19 10.42 
Obedience 0.14 0.11 0.03 2.51 
Control 7.25 7.00 0.25 3.70 
Unselfishness 0.09 0.26 -0.18 -13.32 
Beliefs     
Generalized Trust 0.38 0.24 0.14 7.58 
 
 
 B. Willingness to participate in punishment of wrongdoers  
 
Variables Germany Greece Difference 
Germany-
Greece 
t-test for the 
difference 
Measures of participation in 
punishment  
    
How likely to call the police if 
you see a man get his wallet                                             
stolen? 
3.75 3.47 0.28     16.61 
How willing to identify person 
who had done it? 
3.66 3.24 0.42  22.32 
How willing to give evidence in 
court against the accused? 
3.55 2.90 0.65    29.07 
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Table 2. Germans opinions during the crisis     
  
The table shows the answers provided by a sample of Germans to questions concerning 
the management of the European sovereign debt crisis. Variables are obtained from two 
recurrent polls sponsored by public tv stations. The ARD, which runs the Deutschland-
TREND survey and the ZDF sponsors the Politbarometer survey (denoted Politb in the 
table).  
Question  
 
Question wording Yes No 
 Support to Greece   
1 “Should Greece receive financial aid?” (February, 
2010, Emnid) 
33% 67% 
 Should Greece be given a second round of rescue 
loans? (June 2011, Politb) 
36% 60% 
    
2 Should the other European-States continue to 
support Greece?  (October 2011, D-T) 
42% 53% 
    
3 Will Greece have to leave the Eurozone if it does not 
accept the decisions on the euro rescue? (November 
2011, D-T) 
82% 15% 
    
4 Would Greek bankruptcy entail negative 
consequences for Germany? (September 2011, 
Politb) 
30% 68% 
    
5 Who should continue to be a member of the euro 
zone? (July 2011, Politb) 
  
  - Greece 47% 53% 
  - Spain 77% 23% 
  - Italy 73% 27% 
  - Ireland 
 
67% 33% 
6  Do you think that new government in Greece helps 
overcoming the crisis ? (November 2011, Politb) 
23% 60% 
    
 Support funding the European Financial Stability Fund   
7 Should the funds of the EFSF be expanded?  
(September 2011, Politb)  
 
20% 76% 
 Support to Libya    
8 Should Germany support economically Libya’s  
reconstruction?  (September 2011, D-T) 
70% 27% 
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 Support to Merkel   
9 Are you satisfied with Angela Merkel's handling of 
the crisis? (Politb) 
  
  - September  2011 45% 65% 
  -October        2011 51% 49% 
  -November    2011 56% 44% 
 - January        2012 63% 37% 
 - Spring          2012  (PEW Global Attitudes Project, 
May 2012) 
80% 20% 
10 Support to Merkel’s political party Christian 
Democrat  
Social 
Democrat 
 - Vote intentions: September 2011 35% 28% 
  - Vote intentions: October 2011 32% 30% 
  - Vote intentions: November 2011 34% 31% 
 - Vote intentions: January 2012 35% 30% 
 - Vote intentions: November 2012 39% 30% 
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Table 3. Germans, Greeks and other countries views during the clash      
The table shows the views of citizens of a given country about a set of other countries 
obtained from the PEW Research Center May 2012 Report on the Global Attitudes 
Project.  Each panel shows the views of one country in the Spring of 2010 and in the 
Spring of 2012. The various Panels of the table show the fraction of respondents with a 
“Somewhat unfavorable”, “Very unfavorable” and the sum of the two provided by a 
sample about 1,000  people in each of the countries the panel refers to..   
 
A. German View 
Variables Greece Italy Spain France UK 
      
                                                Spring 2012 
Somewhat unfavorable 50 31 25 17 27 
Very unfavorable 23 2 1 2 2 
Total unfavorable 79 33 26 19 29 
                                                Spring 2010 
Somewhat unfavorable 45 24  16  29  
Very unfavorable 12 4  3 3 
Total unfavorable 70 28  19 32 
 
B. Greek View 
Variables France Italy Spain Germany UK 
                                                Spring 2012 
Somewhat unfavorable 28 21 14 29 36 
Very unfavorable 17 10 11 49 26 
Total unfavorable 45 31 25 78 52 
 
C. French View  
Variables Greece Italy Spain Germany UK 
   Spring 2012   
Somewhat unfavorable 32 26 23 11 18 
Very unfavorable 22 7 6 5 5 
Total unfavorable 54 33 29 16 23 
   Spring 2010   
Somewhat unfavorable 27 18  7  
Very unfavorable 8 5  2  
Total unfavorable 35 23  9  
 
D. British view    
Variables Greece Italy Spain Germany France 
   Spring 2012   
Somewhat unfavorable  33 18 14 14 21 
Very unfavorable 12 5 3 7 8 
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Total unfavorable 55 23 17 21 29 
   Spring 2010   
Somewhat unfavorable  16 7  10  
Very unfavorable 4 2  5  
Total unfavorable 20 9  15  
 
E. Italian view (Spring 2012) 
Variables Greece France Spain Germany UK 
Somewhat unfavorable  45 30 31 21 21 
Very unfavorable 22 13 23 7 7 
Total unfavorable 67 43 54 28 28 
 
 
 
 
F. Spanish view  
Variables Greece Italy France Germany UK 
   Spring 2012   
Somewhat unfavorable  33 28 20 13 17 
Very unfavorable 32 12 10 8 9 
Total unfavorable 65 40 30 21 26 
   Spring 2010   
Somewhat unfavorable  30 11  10  
Very unfavorable 10 3  1   
Total unfavorable 40 14  11  
 
 
 
 
44 
 
Table 4. Germany and Greece bilateral trust views before the clash  
The table shows the fraction of Germans and Greeks that report that they trust citizens 
of the other European countries. Trust is calculated from the average response to the 
following question asked in Eurobarometer in a sequence of surveys run up to 1995: “I 
would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in people from various 
countries.  For each country, please tell me whether you have a lot of trust, some trust, 
not very much trust or no trust at all”.  
 
 
Country receiving trust  Fraction of Germans trusting a lot  Fraction of Greeks trusting a lot   
The Greeks 0.11 - 
The Germans - 0.18 
The Italians 0.08 0.12 
The Spanish 0.14 0.21 
The Portuguese   0.11 0.17 
The Irish 0.13 0.17 
The French 0.21 0.26 
The British 0.15 0.16 
Other European countries   0.16 0.17 
 
  
 
 
Table 5.  Exposures of Germany and France to Greece and other PIIGS countries 
The table shows the value of the claims of German and French banks towards Greece, Ireland, Portugal 
and Spain at the end of Quarter 4 2009. Data are in billions of US Dollars. Source: Stefan Avdjiew, Christian 
Upper and Karsten von Kleist (2010) “Highlights of International Banking and Financial Market Activity”,  
BIS Quartely Review, June, Table 1 p. Graph 3. The data underlying the Graph were kindly provided to us 
by Avdijed et al. Simiilar figures are available for the first quarter of 2010 in the BIS Quarterly Review 
September 2010, Table 1 page 16. 
    
 
  Claims toward  
  Greece Ireland Portugal Spain Total claims to 
the four 
countries 
Claims of       
Germany       
 Total 44.4 176.9 41.0 202.4 464.8 
 Public sector 22.8 2.5 10.3 32.7 68.3 
France       
 Total 108.3 84.8 52.0 248.2 493.3 
 Public sector 30.6 6.1 20.8 48.1 105.6 
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Figure 3. Differences in willingness to punish among Germans and Greeks and 
Germans and French 
The figure shows the distribution of responses given to the questions asked in the 
European Social Survey, Wave 2010 (Round 5): “Imagine that you were out and saw 
someone push a man to the ground and steal his wallet. a) How likely would you be to 
call the police to call the police? b) How willing would you be to identify the person who 
had done it?  c) How willing would you be to give evidence75 in court against the 
accused?” Answers are on a scale between 1 (Not at all likely (willing)) and 4 (Very 
likely (willing)). The first three panels show the histograms for the sample by a sample of 
3031 Germans and 2715 Greeks.  
 
A. Germans versus Greeks  
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b. Willingness to identify person  
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c. Willingness to give evidence in court  
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B. German versus French   
 
a. Willingness to call police  
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b. Willingness to identify person  
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c. Willingness to give evidence in court  
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Figure 5. Risk and solutions for the Euro crisis perceived by German managers  
The figures shows the percentages of responses given by a sample of German managers interviewed in the 
December 2012 IFO German Managers Survey. Panel A shows the answers to the questions: “Which risks 
do firms see for the economy?” Panel B the answers to the question.” Which solutions to the Euro crisis do 
firms prefer?’’ Multiple answers are possible. The figures show the percent of respondents selecting the 
each answer. Responses from 655 companies from the manufacturing, constructions, trade and service 
sector: http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/page/portal/ifoHome/a-
winfo/d1index/80mgrbefr/_managerbefragung?item_link=mb-konjunktur-dez11.htm 
  
Panel A : Risk perceived by German managers 
Risk perceived by German managers
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Panel B : Preferred solutions for the euro crisis 
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Figure 5. Unfavorable view of Greece and punishing attitude 
The figure shows the relation between the fraction of people in some European countries 
with an unfavorable view of Greece from the 2012 PEW Research Center Report and the 
attitude towards punishing in this country measured in the 2010 European Social Survey. 
The latter is measured by the fraction of people who answer “very likely” to the question: 
“Imagine that you were out and saw someone push a man to the ground and steal his 
wallet. How likely would you be to call the police? Would you be” (possible answers 
coded from 1 to 4: not at all likely, not very likely, likely, very likely)” asked in the 
second wave of the European Social Survey. Correlation between the two variables is 
0.57.  
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Figure 6. Interest rate spreads vis-à-vis the Germans Bund   
The figure shows interest rates spreads on 10-years government bonds of Greece and a 
set of other European countries vis-à-vis the German Bund.  Panel A compares Greece 
spreads with Belgium and France; Panel B Greece spreads with Italy, Spain and Portugal.   
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A. Greece spread versus Italy, Spain, Ireland and Portugal 
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
ge
n-0
9
ap
r-0
9
lug
-09
ott
-09
ge
n-1
0
ap
r-1
0
lug
-10
ott
-10
ge
n-1
1
ap
r-1
1
lug
-11
ott
-11
ge
n-1
2
ap
r-1
2
lug
-12
ott
-12
ge
n-1
3
ap
r-1
3
Italy
Spain
Portugal
Ireland
Greece
  
 
 
 
 
Oct 2009 Greece 
Announcement 
deficit is larger 
May  2010 
First aid 
package 
Oct 2009 Greece 
Announcement 
deficit is larger 
May  2010 
First aid 
package 
July  2011 
Second  aid 
package 
July  2011 
Second  aid 
package 
52 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Supports for Greece entering the common market. Fraction of people 
saying Greece entry is a good thing.   
   
The figure shows the fraction of people in various countries saying that Greece admission 
to the common market in 1981 is a good thing.  Source : Eurobarometer, 1980.   
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